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Our main contention in this paper is that modified versions of the so-called “New 
Cambridge” approach to macroeconomic modeling – e.g. Cripps et al. (1976), Godley 
and Fetherston (1978), Godley and Cripps (1983), Godley (1999a), Izurieta (2005), and 
Zezza (2009), inter alia – are both quite useful for modeling real capitalist economies in 
historical time, and perfectly compatible with the “vision” underlying modern Post-
Keynesian stock-flow consistent (SFC) models (as discussed, for example, in Godley, 
1999b, Lavoie and Godley, 2001-2002; Dos Santos, 2005 and 2006; Godley and 
Lavoie, 2007a; and Macedo e Silva and Dos Santos, forthcoming).  
Both claims may appear trivial at first. For one thing, it is now beyond doubt that 
the work done by New Cambridge economists at the Levy Economics Institute clearly 
anticipated the problems now facing the U.S and world economies.
4 Moreover, one does 
find mentions to the three balances model in the modern SFC literature (e.g. Godley and 
Lavoie, 2005-2006 and 2007b). However, these mentions are invariably made in the 
context of simplified stationary models without private investment, the inclusion of 
which can change things considerably (as acknowledged by Godley and Lavoie 
themselves).
5 And there still appears to be considerable doubt – even among heterodox 
economists potentially friendly to the approach – about why exactly the New Cambridge 
three balances approach (which many consider too aggregated and/or simple and/or 
based on implausible behavioral assumptions) is useful for applied macroeconomic 
modeling.    
More to the point, we see the “New Cambridge” approach as an elegant and 
parsimonious applied macroeconomic modeling strategy which can and should be 
dissociated from its “trademark” behavioral assumption according to which the private 
sector as a whole behaves in such a way as to keep the ratio of private financial assets 
(net of financial liabilities) to private disposable income relatively constant over time – 
and, more generally, from any particular behavioral hypothesis adopted by its 
practitioners in any given historical context. The details of our argument – which does 
not necessarily represent the (complex, nuanced, and ever-changing) views of the 
original “New Cambridge” economists
6 – are presented in the fourth section of this 
                                                            
4 See, for example, Godley (1999), Godley and Izurieta (2002), Shaikh, Papadimitriou, Dos Santos and 
Zezza (2002), Godley, Papadimitriou, Dos Santos, and Zezza (2005) and Godley, Papadimitriou, 
Hannsgen, and Zezza (2007). 
5 See, for example, Godley and Lavoie (2005-2006, p.252, footnote 15).  
6 All New Cambridge economists have deeply inspired us. Some of them we are proud to call friends. 
And none of them will probably agree with us on everything we have to say. But which group of gifted 
economists ever reaches a consensus about anything complex, after all?
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paper. Before we can get to those, we need first to remind readers of the exact meaning 
of the “three financial balances” that appear so prominently in New Cambridge papers 
(in section 1), of the large macroeconomic literature dealing with these balances (in 
section 2), and of the general characteristics of (and the Schumpeterian “vision” 
underlying) the modern Post-Keynesian “stock-flow consistent” literature (in section 3). 
Brief concluding remarks are presented in section 5.  
 
1 – A primer on (Private, Public, and External) Financial Balances 
 
We all know from basic national accounting that: 
Y ≡ Cp+ Ip + Cg + Ig + X –M (Identity 1).  
In words, “GDP” (Y) is identical to “total expenditure in final goods and services”, i.e. 
the sum of private consumption and investment (Cp + Ip), government consumption and 
investment (Cg + Ig), and exports of goods and services minus imports of goods and 
services.     
Implicit in the identity above is, of course, the assumption that the economic 
agents can be meaningfully aggregated in three “institutional sectors”, i.e. the private, 
government, and external sectors. Evidently, agents of each of these three sectors 
continuously make unilateral transfers and pay property incomes to agents of the other 
two sectors. Let us, then, define: 
T = taxes paid by private sector agents to the government minus the net unilateral 
financial transfers made by the government to private sector agents minus the net 
property income paid by the government to private sector agents; 
Trge = net unilateral transfers made by the government to the external sector plus net 
property income paid by the government to the external sector; 
Trpe = net unilateral transfers made by the private sector to the external sector plus net 
property income paid by the private sector to the external sector.  
  We can, therefore, rewrite the basic national accounting identity above as: 
Y – T – Trpe ≡ Cp + Ip+ Cg + Ig + Trge – T + X – M – Trpe – Trge. 
This, in turn, implies that: 
Y – T – Trpe – Cp – Ip ≡ (Cg + Ig + Trge – T) + (X – M – Trpe – Trge) (Identity 2). 
Or equivalently: 
PFB (Private Financial Balance) ≡ – GFB (Government Financial Balance) + CAB 
(Current Account Balance),   
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where PFB ≡ Y– T– Trpe–Cp–Ip; GFB ≡ T–Cg–Ig–Trge; and CAB ≡ X – M – Trpe – Trge. 
  Obviously, private (government) financial balance equals private (government) 
saving minus private (government) investment. Identity 2 can then be trivially 
rearranged to show that: 
SAVp – Ip  ≡ - (SAVg - Ig) + CAB (Identity 3), where  
SAVp (private saving) ≡ Y-T-Trpe-Cp; and SAVg (government saving) ≡ T - Cg - Trge,  
which expresses the well known national accounting fact that, ex-post, it is always true 
that total saving equals total investment in any given economy.  
  Though the algebra of identity 2 – much less common than the third one – is 
trivial to anyone familiar with basic national accounting, the exact meaning of its first 
term, the private financial balance (which is a proxy for the “net lending by the private 
sector” to use modern national accounts terminology),
7 is often non-trivial to many 
economists.
8 We need, therefore, to clarify this specific concept before we proceed.  
  In order to understand the various possible meanings of the private financial 
balance it is crucial to think of the private sector in disaggregated terms. Following both 
modern Post-Keynesian SFC models and national accounts, we find it useful to 
disaggregate the private sector in three smaller institutional sectors, i.e. the 
“households,” “firms,” and “banking” (or “financial”) sectors. In other words, it is often 
useful to think of total PFB as the sum of households’ FB, firms’ FB, and bank’s (or 
financial sector’s) FB.   
Consider a situation in which the private financial balance (net lending) is, say, 
$500. What does this imply for the financial balance of, say, the households’ (or firms’ 
or banks’) sector? The answer, in principle, is nothing at all. All it implies is that the 
sum of the financial balances of households, firms, and banks (all taken as “a whole”) is 
$500. And, of course, there are countless combinations of households’, firms’ and 
banks’ financial balances that add up to $500. This will be the case, for example, if the 
                                                            
7 See, for example, Lequiller and Blade (2006, chapter 8). The same concept used to be called “net 
accumulation of financial assets” (or “NAFA”) in the 1970s. We stick here to modern terminology, 
among other reasons because the term “net accumulation of financial assets” is now used in the national 
accounts to designate a completely different concept (see section 2). 
8 A fact that, according to Cuthbertson (1979, p. 53), did not help New Cambridge economists to make 
themselves clearly understood when first presenting their ideas in the middle of the 1970s. Years later, 
Pasinetti (1984, p. 111) made a similar point: “the macroeconomic magnitudes or the behavioral 
relationships about these magnitudes that we are offered [by New Cambridge economists] are not 
coincidental with those to which we have been accustomed by current macroeconomic theory (…). But 
are these to be intended as alternative or complementary to the more traditional or better known ones? In 
the former case, it is not clear on which criteria one should choose, or which of them should be taken as 
the most important; in the latter case, we are not told how they should be merged together.”    
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financial balances of households, firms, and banks are, respectively, $180, $170, and 
$150. But it will also happen if the numbers are (again, respectively) $10,000, minus 
$9,500, and $0; or minus $20,000, $5,000, and $15,500. So, in principle, one can never 
be sure. 
  Some quick comments on the financial balances of these three private 
institutional sectors are in order. The brief discussion will make clear why identity 2 
illuminates the Minskyan theme of financial fragility,
9 for financial balances can be 
interpreted as proxies  of changes in the liquidity (and in the financial fragility) of 
sectors.  
   
1.1 – Firms’ Financial Balance (or Net Lending/Borrowing)  
 
Firms’ financial balance (FFB) – usually a negative figure, for firms’ investment tends 
to be larger than their saving (i.e. retained earnings) – is probably the most familiar of 
all private financial balances, so we will begin with it. It is, indeed, well known that 
firms have four possible ways to finance their investment, i.e. (i) with their own 
accumulated capital; (ii) with (retained) current profits; (iii) with bank loans; or (iv) by 
issuing new shares or bonds and selling them to the public. A negative FFB therefore 
implies that firms will have to finance it either with their accumulated financial reserves 
(which implies a reduction in their financial assets) and/or by getting loans from banks 
and/or by selling new bonds (both of which imply an increase in their financial 
liabilities) and/or by selling new shares (which national accountants consider an 
increase in firms’ net worth)
10.    
Table 1 below illustrates what we just said with a numerical example. Part A 
depicts the balance sheet of one firm, which has accumulated financial assets 
(FA=$300) and physical capital (pK=$600). Moreover, its financial liabilities reach 
$400 ($250 in bank loans and $150 in bonds) and the value of the shares it sold to the 
general public is $450. Part B, in turn, depicts the balance sheet of the same firm after 
financing $400 in new physical capital with a combination of $ 90 in retained earnings, 
$ 150 in new bank loans, $ 50 in new bonds, $ 40 in new shares, and $70 in previously 
accumulated financial assets; we assume there has been no change in the value of the 
                                                            
9 See, for instance, Minsky (1982: 5). 
10 See Lequiller and Blade (2006, chapter 8). Most modern Post-Keynesian models adopt a different 
accounting convention, though, treating shares sold to the public as part of firms’ financial liabilities.  
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shares. The FB of this particular firm in this particular period was then minus $310 (i.e. 
the result of $90 in retained profits minus $ 400 in the acquisition of new physical 
capital); this negative FB implied a reduction of $70 in firms’ accumulated financial 
assets, an increase of $200 in its accumulated financial liabilities and an increase of $40 
in its shares.  
 
 Table 1: Theoretical Balance Sheet of one given firm  
A. In the beginning of a given period 
Assets  Liabilities and Net Worth 
Bank Loans = $ 250  Financial Assets = $300 
Bonds Issues = $ 150 
Value of its shares sold to the general public  = 
$450 
 
Physical Capital = $600 
Net Worth = $500=$50+$450=($900–$400) 
Memo:  Financial Assets – Financial Liabilities – Shares = -$550 (=$300 – $400 – $450) 
B. In the end of the period 
Assets  Liabilities and Net Worth 
Bank Loans = $400  Financial Assets = $230 
Bonds = $200  
Value of its shares sold to the general public  = 
$490 
 
Physical Capital = $1000 
Net Worth =$630 =$140+$490(=$1230–$600) 
Memo: Financial Assets – Financial Liabilities – Shares = -$860 (=$230 - $400 - $200 - $490) 
 
The example above is meant to illuminate the point that a negative FB (or the 
fact that the firm was a “net borrower”) usually implies a decrease in the ratio of firms’ 
“financial assets” to their financial liabilities (bonds and loans), unless, of course, the 
whole FB is covered by issuing shares. At any rate, it can be stated that a negative FB 
increases the claims – either contractual (interest) or contingent (dividends) – on the 
firms’ financial assets. One can therefore say that, ceteris paribus, a negative FB 
reduces the portfolio liquidity (measured as a ratio between financial – hence liquid – 
assets and cash payment commitments) and increases its financial fragility.
11  
 Note also that nothing we said so far prevents firms from having a positive 
financial balance. It might well be that retained earnings happen to be higher than the 
acquisition of new physical capital in any given year or quarter in any given firm or for 
the firms’ sector as a whole – which, in turn, usually implies increases in the ratio of 
total financial assets over total financial liabilities of this given firm/firms’ sector as a 
whole. In the 1960-2007 period, this was never the case for U.S. non-corporate firms, 
but happened every once in a while with U.S. corporations – often during recession 
                                                            
11 This ratio must be understood as a proxy of portfolio liquidity. A more accurate measure would take 
into account the liquidity of each and every asset (financial or not) in the portfolio. Clearly enough, a 
portfolio can then become more or less liquid even if the financial balance is zero.  
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times, in which investment falls and the liquidity preference of corporations is likely to 
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1.2 – The Financial Balances of Households and Banks 
 
And what about the financial balance of households (i.e. the difference between 
households’ saving and investment)?  Two important differences are that (i) households 
cannot finance themselves issuing and selling new shares; and (ii) households’ 
investment (often simplified away in theoretical models, even if it is quite large in 
actual economies) consists mostly of housing expenditures. Other than that, things are 
pretty much the same as before, with positive (negative) financial balances being 
associated with increases (decreases) in the ratio of total financial assets over total 
financial liabilities of the households’ sector as a whole.  And even if there is no strong 
theoretical hypothesis about the sign of the household financial balance in any given 
year, one would expect it to be positive (or at least neutral) over the years so as to 
prevent the financial assets to financial liabilities ratio of households from deteriorating 
indefinitely (as was the case in the U.S. from the late 1990s until 2008, as emphasized 
by many New Cambridge economists during these years).   
The case of “banks” (or more generally, of the financial sector as a whole) is 
more complex. To be sure, they also save (i.e. retain profits) and acquire new physical 
capital, so their financial balance can be calculated as the financial balance of any other 
sector. Contrarily to a common (merely simplifying, we must add) assumption in 
theoretical SFC models, the financial balance of the financial sector is often quite 
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On the other hand, banks (and the financial sector as a whole) hold enormous 
amounts of private and public debt and may or may not hold enormous amounts of 
external financial assets as well (depending on the precise institutional arrangement and 
degree of capital account liberalization at hand). 
  
1.3 – In sum: Financial balances as incomplete but useful guides to balance sheet 
dynamics 
 
As seen above, the financial balance of any given sector conveys useful information 
about how the balance sheet of this given sector is changing. But it is important to 
reiterate that it is far from a complete description of all the sector’s balance sheet 
changes. In particular, it tells us nothing about the capital gains/losses incurred by the 
sector and cannot inform us of the precise changes in the composition of the sector’s 





Table 2.  Theoretical balance sheet of a household  
A – Household H’s Balance Sheet in Beginning of the Accounting Period 
A.1 - Total Assets = $140,000  A.2 - Total Liabilities = $50,000 
    A.1.a - House: $100,000        A.2.a - Bank Loans: $ 50,000 
    A.1.b - 1000 Equities of “Company X”: $30,000   
    A.1.c - Bank Deposits: $10,000  A.3 - Net Worth = (A.1) – (A.2) = $ 90,000  
B – Relevant Flows During the Accounting Period 
Saving = $ 2000  Investment = $ 10,000 
Financial Balance = - $8000   
C – Total Capital Gains During the Accounting Period = $ 30,000 
C.1 – From an increase in the price of 1 equity of “Company X” from $3 to $ 4: $10,000; 
C.2 – From an increase in the price of the house (before the new investment): $ 20,000  
D – Household H’s Balance Sheet in the End of the Accounting Period 
D.1 – Total Assets = $175,000  D.2 - Total Liabilities = $53,000 
    D.1.a - House: $130,000        D.2.a - Bank Loans: $ 53,000 
    D.1.b - 1000 Equities of “Company X”: $40,000   
    D.1.c - Bank Deposits: $5,000  D.3 - Net Worth = (D.1) – (D.2) = $122,000 
E – Household H’s Balance Sheet in the End of the Accounting Period Without Capital Gains 
E.1 – Total Assets = $145,000  D.2 - Total Liabilities = $53,000 
    D.1.a - House: $110,000        D.2.a - Bank Loans: $ 53,000 
    D.1.b - 1000 Equities of “Company X”: $30,000   
    D.1.c - Bank Deposits: $5,000  D.3 - Net Worth = (D.1) – (D.2) = $92,000  
  
In the example, most changes in the net worth of “household H” (see parts A and 
D) are due to capital gains (in her house and in her equities of “Company X” – see part 
C). Note that if she had had no capital gains at all, her net worth would have increased 
only by the amount of her saving (i.e. $2000 – see parts A, B, and E). The actual change 
in the net worth (i.e $32,000, see part D) is given by the saving ($ 2000) plus the capital 
gains ($30,000 – see part C), though.  
The fact that households’ H financial balance is negative – for her saving 
($2000) was not enough to finance all her investment ($10,000, in improvements in her 
house) – means only that the ratio of her financial assets to her financial liabilities has 
decreased (from 10,000/50,000 to 5,000/53,000) or, in other words, that she has become 
cet. par. less liquid (even if she got richer). This is only to be expected, since the 
financial balance is given by her saving (assumed to be liquid) minus her investment in 
physical capital (which is illiquid by definition). Note also that the fact that we know 
that household H’s financial balance was minus $8000 says nothing about how the 
precise composition of her financial assets and liabilities has changed. She could 
conceivably have financed her negative financial balance reducing only her bank 
deposits (which would then have fallen from $10,000 to $2,000). She chose instead to 
increase her bank loans by $3,000, reducing her bank deposits only by $ 5,000.    
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To reiterate: a negative (positive) financial balance means only that (cet. par.) 
the agent/sector is getting less (more) liquid and more (less) fragile. It does not imply 
that it is getting poorer, nor does it convey any information about how the composition 
of its balance sheet has changed precisely.
12    
This is precisely why the Levy Strategic Analyses put so much emphasis in the 
negative U.S. private financial balance from 1997 onwards. The point was that this 
continuous reduction in liquidity meant a continuous increase in private (in particular 
households’, as information from disaggregated data made clear) financial fragility that 
would prove detrimental if and when capital gains in the real estate markets turned into 
capital losses. At this point, one would have to count on a massive “Big Government” 
intervention to help private balance sheets (as happened in 2009, when the government 
financial balance reached minus 11% of GDP, the largest deficit in the last 50 years), 
given the fact that (as Minsky well knew) to increase the public deficit is probably the 
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12According to Zezza (2009: 19), “a positive balance implies that, for that sector, injections exceed 
leakages, so that that sector is a net contributor to aggregate demand.” While this statement is generally 
true, it is important to notice that it holds strictly only in the case of the external “sector”; if net exports 
are zero, there is no impact on GDP. But if government (or firms’ or households’) expenditures increase 
at a higher rate, even with a balanced budget, this will represent (unless the extra expenditure “leaks” as 
imports) a bigger contribution to aggregate demand. Therefore, we would rather stick to customary 
national accounting practices, which say that the contribution to aggregate demand of any “sector” 
(and/or of any final demand component) depends on its relative size and on its relative growth rate. But 
by saying this we do not mean to deny that if any sector’ expenditure grows quicker than its earnings, its 
deficit will in general be expansionary, besides implying a surplus and an accumulation of assets by some 
other sectors, which are bound to have further (and not trivial) effects on effective demand.  
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2  – The three balances and open economy macroeconomics  
  
Aggregate financial balances have been among economists for a long time. Some 
traditions have been aware of their presence, and have tried to cope with them in a more 
straightforward manner, while others (whether consciously or not) have neglected them. 
At their own peril, we might add, and will try to show, taking as an example the case of 
Mundell-Fleming models, still an important part of the “trained intuition” of a large part 
of the macroeconomics profession.  
According to Barbosa-Filho et al. (2006) (but see Rada and Taylor, 2006, as 
well), three main “schools of thought” have discussed aggregate financial balances:
13 
the “Ricardian” rational expectations (RE) approach of Barro (1974) and others; the 
“Twin-Deficit” (TD) approach associated, among others, with Polak (1957); and the 
heterodox structuralist “external” gap (SG) view. 
  These three “schools” suggest three different causality structures for the three 
balances. The TD approach tends to think of the private financial balance as largely 
independent of the other two. Any attempts by the government to use fiscal policy to 
expand the economy would therefore imply an increase in the current account deficit (or 
a reduction in the current account balance).  In the RE approach, on the other hand, it is 
the current account balance that is largely independent of the other two. In particular, 
any attempts by the government to use fiscal policy to expand the economy would 
imply a reduction in the private financial balance (in anticipation of future increases in 
taxation necessary to keep government finances inter-temporally solvent). Finally, the 
SG story is similar to the RE story in assuming the current account balance as largely 
independent of the other two, even though for quite different reasons. Structuralists do 
not assume full employment of the labor force, of course, and are perfectly happy with 
independent increases in private net lending/borrowing leading (as opposed to 
responding to) reductions/increases in the government financial balance. The current 
account independence in SG models has little to do with agents solving inter-temporal 
maximization problems with full knowledge of future events, and a lot to do with 
structural factors (such as deteriorating terms of trade and/or lack of competitive 
advantages in external markets for goods and services, and/or imperfections in 
                                                            
13 Though normally under conditions in which financial balances collapse into saving (that is, assuming 
that neither households nor the government invest).  
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international financial markets) that imply that private and government financial 
balances must sooner or later adjust so as to reduce too high a current account deficit.      
Curiously enough, in light of the aforementioned literature, financial balances 
are virtually ignored in many strands of short-period open economy macroeconomics. 
The object, of course, is always there, as a matter of logical necessity. Moreover, even 
in the framework of short-period models, we can easily show the implications of 
different shocks to private, government or external FBs. As announced, we will use the 
Mundell-Fleming (MF) model to illustrate our point.
14  
We begin by appending some simple (and in principle quite harmless) features 
to an otherwise standard MF model. We will only consider the standard “short-run” 
case, in which there is involuntary unemployment and prices are given. Three different 
shocks will be analyzed in some different institutional/behavioral scenarios. The shocks 
are increases in “money supply” (ΔM), in government expenditure (ΔG0) and in private 
investment (ΔI0). Though most textbooks only describe government shocks, there is 
obviously no reason at all to abstract the possibility of an autonomous change in private 
expenditure, as in investment (given, e.g., a change in animal spirits). The various 
institutional/behavioral  scenarios we are interested in depend on the exchange rate 
regime (fixed or fully flexible) and on the degree of international capital mobility 
(perfect or none). We will assume, as is customary, that under perfect capital mobility 
and perfect substitutability between financial assets, internal and external interest rates 
must be equal.  
As most textbook authors, we feel there is no need to write down all the 
equations of a standard MF model. It is important to notice, however, that, banks play 
no particular role in the MF models, so that – as correctly emphasized by Godley in 
many occasions, we may ignore them.   
To simplify and to present a rendition which is closer to the usual ones, we use 
the trade account to define the external FB. This only makes sense if we assume that, in 
the initial situation, international flows related to external assets and liabilities are zero. 
Note that, without residential investment, households’ financial balance (HFB) equals 
household saving; without government investment, the same applies to GFB and the 
                                                            
14 It is fair to note that, though the canonical depictions of the MF model ignore financial balances, 
connections between them were occasionally considered. In fact, the first reaction of the profession to the 
New Cambridge literature – which, as discussed below, did side with Polak´s twin deficit hypothesis 
(though for quite different reasons) – was to check whether New Cambridge results could be derived in 
the context of Mundell-Fleming-type models (see, for example, Vines, 1976 ; and Mata, 2006).     
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budget surplus. As in many standard macro models, households normally have positive 
FB
15 and are net creditors. In the very simple model thus sketched, households own 
firms (and we assume they receive a constant share of current profits) and debt, issued 
by government and firms. When firms have a negative FB, they issue more bonds. We 
assume the government has a budget deficit and is a net debtor. There is only one 
internal interest rate. 
It is difficult, we think, to define a simpler (and still useful for our purposes) 
model. Though we are not exactly in the textbook MF world anymore, we believe we 
did no violence to the model at all. Let us now face some of the “cases” usually 
described in the MF literature.  
It is interesting to begin with a case where pretty nothing is supposed to happen 
after the initial shock. Every macroeconomics student quickly learns that, with a fixed 
exchange rate and perfect capital mobility, monetary policy is “inefficient.” The sole 
final result of a monetary expansion will be a change in the central bank portfolio: 
foreign reserves are replaced by money, and the contraction of money supply brings the 
economy back to the initial income and interest rate levels. However, if we assume that 
the shock did manage to stimulate the economy for a while, there will be some other 
definite consequences to the distribution of net wealth among institutional sectors.  
It is easy to show this (though, for lack of space, we will dispense with the 
customary graphical apparatus). Firstly, we will describe the temporary changes: the 
increase in income will imply a decrease in CAB (i.e., a fall in net exports), which must 
correspond to a temporary decrease in the aggregate of the remaining balances. Now, 
GFB must increase, for the increase in income produces an increase in taxes, while G0 is 
given.
16 Households available income increases as well, and so does their saving, which 
is the sector’s FB. It follows that firms’ financial balances must  fall, as well as 
aggregate private FB. The explanation for the fall in FFB is pretty simple: the decrease 
in trade balance reduces firms’ profits (as a Kaleckian approach would clearly 
demonstrate); besides, if we find it reasonable that the temporary fall in the interest rate 
increases firms’ investment, this will produce a bigger increase in firms’ expenditure 
                                                            
15 That is to say, unless households disposable income is very low and the consumption function has an 
autonomous term. 
16 We abstract here from the possible effect of the temporary fall in r on interest flows paid by 
government and firms.  
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than in their retained profits (and, as a matter of fact, in their total profits as well).
17 
(Those results are summarized in table 3.) 
It is true that the economy will come back to the original coordinates (Y, r). 
However, in the “final” short-run equilibrium, the net wealth of each institutional sector 
will have changed. Households’ net assets will have increased. The brief reduction in 
budget deficit means that the public debt will be smaller than otherwise would have 
happened. International investment position will have worsened. And the sole possible 
counterpart to all these changes will have been an increase in firms’ debt. Those 
changes in stocks of financial assets and liabilities will implicate changes in internal and 
international interest flows in the next short run, changing the configuration of the 
system. Therefore, each short period carries in itself the seeds of the next (and 
inevitably different) short period. This is all the more true in other cases described 
below, in which the commonly acknowledged “final” changes are more significant. 
Let us describe, in the same institutional scenario, the results of the other two 
kinds of shocks. Both an increase in private investment and in government consumption 
will be efficient in obtaining a “permanently” higher income level at the original interest 
rate. We may then concentrate on “final” results.
18 Both demand shocks will cause a 
decrease in CAB and an increase in HFB. An increase in private investment will bring 
about an increase in GFB. Once more, a reduction in FFB is the only thing that can, as a 
matter of logical necessity, “compensate” the other changes; again PFB has to fall. If the 
shock comes from fiscal expansion, though we know that GFB will fall,
19 we cannot be 
sure about what happens to FFB, for the increase in G0 and the decrease in net exports 
have opposite effects on profits.
20 To obtain a definite result, it would be necessary to 
fully specify the functions and elasticities used in the model. 
In the case of flexible exchange rate regime with r = r*, Mundel-Fleming models 
tell us that monetary policy “works”: a reduction in the interest rate does increase 
income, by way of currency depreciation. We will leave temporary effects aside. There 
happens, of course, an increase in net exports (CAB rises). With the increase in income, 
the budget deficit falls (GFB increases) and households saving increases (as does HFB). 
                                                            
17 Please notice that, in a Kaleckian world, changes in investment and in net exports only affect profits 
pro tanto if workers spend what they earn. In the general case, an increase in investment will produce a 
smaller increase in profits. This would result in a fall in FFB even if firms did not distribute profits.  
18 We will assume, for instance, that the impact of the transiently higher interest rate on interests flows 
paid by government and firms is negligible. 
19 Given our assumptions, budget deficit always increases when government consumption increases (see, 
for instance, Dornbusch & Fischer, 1978/1990: 92). 
20 O efeito líquido sobre os lucros dependeria do valor (ΔGFB - ΔXFB).  
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It is obvious that, since investment does not change and profits increase with the 
improvement in net exports, FFB (and PFB) must rise as well.  
 
Table 3. A summary of the results 
ΔHFB + ΔFFB + ΔGFB = ΔXFB 
1. Fixed exchange rate, perfect mobility, r = r* 
  ΔHFB  ΔFFB  ΔGFB  ΔXFB 
a. Monetary expansion*  +  -  +  - 
b. Increase in investment  +  -  +  - 
c. Fiscal expansion  +  ?  -  - 
2. Flexible exchange rate, perfect mobility, r = r* 
a. Monetary expansion  +  +  +  + 
b. Increase in investment  0  -  0  - 
c. Fiscal expansion  0  0  -  - 
* Temporary effects. 
 
  In this same context, positive shocks in expenditure variables will not increase 
income, but will reduce net exports (for the increase in expenditure leads to a temporary 
increase in the interest rate, that in turn causes capital inflows that will permanently 
appreciate the currency). An increase in investment will be exactly matched by a 
decrease in net exports; the same will happen in the case of an increase in government 
consumption. Other financial balances will not change. In other words, any increase in 
expenditure will produce the famous twin deficits.
21 However, the internal counterpart 
of the worsening of international investment position will be a bigger private or public 
debt depending on which sector was responsible for the initial shock.  
  Notice that, in most cases – the exceptions being the two twin deficits – the 
shocks described tend to produce temporary (but not necessarily irrelevant) or enduring 
changes in all balances (though in one case we were unable to define the sign of ΔFFB). 
It is not at all surprising that no case describes the predictions of the ER and the SG 
approaches. To obtain ER results, we would have to assume a very different kind of 
consumption function. SG results, on the other hand, have been assumed away by the 
very assumptions of perfect mobility and homogeneity between internal and external 
financial assets.  
However, it is pretty easy to depict an SG situation. Just imagine there is no 
capital mobility (which implies that the BP curve is vertical). If we start at a situation in 
which CAB = 0, it is clear that, with a fixed exchange rate, income cannot grow but for 
a limited period. Monetary expansion would produce, as before, loss of reserves (and, 
                                                            
21  Though the expression was originally restricted, of course, to the case in which government is the 
culprit for the imbalance in external accounts.  
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eventually, a balance of payments crisis), so that it would have to be reversed, sooner or 
later. The same would apply to increases in private investment or in government 
consumption. The fall in reserves
22 would force the government to act. In the case of an 
original increase in investment, it would have to be reverted with an increase in interest 
rate or accommodated by means of a reduction in government consumption; FFB and 
GFB would present compensatory changes, as in Barbosa-Filho et al.’s story. A fiscal 
stimulus could be either reversed or accommodated by means of an increase in interest 
rate, in which case, again, we would find compensatory changes in FFB and GFB.
23  
   Financial balances are obviously important. To properly analyze then and their 
implications, however, one has to define more complex models than usual short-period 
ones, so that interest flows and stocks of debt can play a role. Financial balances show 
that each short-period implies changes in those stocks and flows. And they do cast a 
doubt about common assumptions about long-run trajectories. If, for instance, firms’ 
debt is growing rapidly, shouldn’t one take this into consideration when analyzing the 
medium run? But, if we start to connect short-run periods in such a way, can we be sure 
that we will obtain a trajectory that ends in the long run as described, for instance, in 
neoclassical growth models? The answer is usually no.  
  We think, in sum, that macroeconomic models that want to peer beyond the 
short run while omitting balance sheet implications of the very flows they assume are 
dangerously incomplete. Looking carefully at financial balances minimizes the potential 
damage. However, even this may not be enough, for financial balances do not tell the 
whole story of balance sheet dynamics, as we saw above. Telling the whole story 
requires, of course, a full-fledged SFC model.  
 
3– Modern Post-Keynesian Stock-flow Consistent Models as the heterodox 
equivalents to Arrow-Debreu constructs   
 
 
Most heterodox approaches share, to some extent, a common Schumpeterian vision of 
capitalist economy. When they look at it, they first discern social classes and institutions 
and then individual agents. Moreover, they do not believe that markets are able to 
harmonize agents’ decisions. On the contrary: they emphasize that conflicts between 
                                                            
22 More realistically, the external restriction would be felt as a rise in country risk-premium and/or credit 
rationing. 
23 Notice that, in the case of flexible exchange rates, similar stories can be told, especially in the case of 
developing countries for which currency depreciation can have important inflationary impacts and crucial 
balance-sheet effects, since their external debt is denominated in foreign key currencies.   
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agents who occupy very asymmetric positions are not only unavoidable but the very 
engine behind the evolution of the economy.  
  In such a vision, agents are what they own. Agents who own more have more 
economic power. Agents who are “rich” try to get richer and richer, and the decisions 
they make about how to allocate their wealth are crucial for determining the evolution 
of aggregate income, employment and wealth over time.   
  In Marxian or Kaleckian contexts, one often finds a somewhat crude (but 
analytically useful) opposition between “capitalists” and “workers.” In some of Keynes’ 
works (mainly in Keynes 1923 and 1930), the social landscape includes firms, banks, 
rentiers, workers as private agents who play different roles, own different assets (and 
liabilities) and have different interests (see Macedo e Silva and Dos Santos, 2009).  
  All these defining features are explicitly emphasized in SFC models. In this 
sense, SFC models are a direct expression of this heterodox Schumpeterian vision. As a 
matter of fact, the contemporary SFC literature is mainly Keynesian (and Kaleckian, 
though not Marxian). However, while doing full justice to Keynes’ political economy 
vision, it introduces critical ruptures with traditional Keynesian modeling strategies, 
which tend to concentrate on flows (and for this reason are either too partial or quickly 
become stock-flow inconsistent) or to treat stocks in too simplified a way.  
During the sixties, many Keynesians came to the conclusion that the poverty of 
Keynesian macroeconomics – however hegemonic it (still) was – was linked to the 
failure in connecting stocks and flows in an institutionally richer framework (see Dos 
Santos, 2006). Tobin realized it and started to develop, in a more neoclassical guise, his 
stock-flow consistent models. Davidson and Minsky founded their seminal 
contributions on the Treatise on Money and on General Theory’s chapter 17. In those 
texts, Keynes makes clear that “instrumental goods” are just one specific form of wealth 
and that investment is just a “trifling” part of the many portfolio decisions that wealth-
owners (firms, rentiers, banks…) make during any period of time. In the Treatise, the 
centrality of banks and of their relations with wealth-owners (as other “technical 
details”) do not fall (as in the General Theory) “into the background” (Keynes, 1936: 
vii).  
In his models, Tobin was never particularly concerned with the question of 
traverse. On the other hand, Davidson and Minsky were themselves strongly concerned 
with the study of dynamic processes which can result in instability or crises. But their  
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insightful contributions were mainly conveyed in a literary way; at any rate, they never 
tried to present a formal model connecting periods of time. 
 But this is precisely what SFC models do. They start from the definition of a 
social structure which can be as complicated as deemed necessary to the objectives of 
the analysis. They explicitly show who owns what and how – that is to say, they 
thoroughly describe assets and liabilities of each “agent” (or rather of each social class, 
group or institution included in the model). Building upon the Keynesian/Kaleckian 
tradition, they assume a set of behavioral functions, specific to each type of agent. 
Structure and behavior defines the physiology of the system. Conditions for short-
period equilibrium are clearly specified. The evolution of the system can then be 
studied. According to the posited initial conditions, one can study how each short-
period (in equilibrium or not) connects to the next. One is free to introduce exogenous 
changes even in notoriously rebel variables such as confidence and liquidity preference 
or (if one is bold enough) to try to make them endogenous.  
SFC models are, in our opinion, fully compatible both with the Kaleckian view 
that the long-run is only a sequence of short runs and with Joan Robinson’s concern 
with the need to put forward analyses that happen in historical (and not logical) time. 
They make clear that, however unstable expectations are, there will be always some 
things an analyst can rely on: a social structure, a previous pattern of expenditure and 
income flows (and of deficits and surpluses) and a historically inherited network of 
assets and liabilities. To know what those structures and patterns are is of course a 
condition to understand how they can change.
24  
Heterogeneity has been repeatedly appointed as a reason for the weakness of 
heterodoxy; this heterogeneity tends to be unfavorably compared to the coherence of the 
neoclassical paradigm. In fact, one can argue that neoclassical economists do share a 
Schumpeterian vision and a core model, which is, of course, the Arrow-Debreu model. 
The aim of this model, as we all know, is to describe the (strict) conditions in which the 
invisible hand does the job it is supposed to do. Most neoclassical economists do not 
work in the development of their core model, but are pretty content in using it 
(responsibly or not) as a benchmark.  
                                                            
24 Models in which there are flows that do not feed into stocks, in which there are interest rates that do not 
correspond to any asset, in which assets are created without corresponding liabilities are certainly obscure 
and probably misleading. Heterodox economists (who justifiably despise trivially stock-flow consistent 
neoclassical models in which there is nobody but the representative agent) must be particularly careful 
when developing models that describe complex social structures.  
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We contend it is useful to think of SFC modeling strategy as, mutatis mutandis, 
the heterodox equivalents of the Arrow-Debreu model.
25 The mutatis mutandis clause is 
crucial here. Our somewhat bold claim derives from our perception that SFC modeling 
strategy is coherent with a broad heterodox vision and can accommodate – potentially at 
least – the different aspects underlined by different heterodox schools of thought.
26 
Moreover, our claim does not mean to contradict in any way the healthy skepticism of 
heterodox economists – who pay so much attention to both structure and history –
towards attempts at general modeling. While understandable, we believe that these 
concerns are to some extent unwarranted, for SFC models are inherently flexible and 
therefore can be tailored so as to incorporate the very many structural and institutional 
realities, behaviors, and historically relevant accumulation regimes.  
As a matter of fact, this flexibility has been intensively explored by the fast 
growing SFC literature. Stationary or growth models now examine themes such as the 
impact of economic policies, changes in income distribution, technological change, and 
the nature of finance-led regimes. Open-economy models appear as heterodox 
counterparts to the usual Mundel-Fleming framework, and start to discuss contemporary 
(and crucial) issues such as the so-called global imbalances and the global implications 
of changes in exchange rates regimes by key countries. The scope of the current SFC 
literature is very broad indeed, and the complexity of the models can be increased at 
will, given the easiness with which one can program computer simulations nowadays. 
The practitioner is free to model, for instance, different kinds of disequilibria, in 
different markets, or to introduce different goods, assets (and their respective volumes 
and prices), industries (or Kaleckian departments), or types of financial institutions and 
so on.  
The appearance of a myriad of models is clearly understandable and indeed 
welcome, as practitioners explore the modeling strategy while trying to address the 
heterodox urge towards “realism.” For, in a sense, bigger models (with more sectors, 
more assets, etc.) undoubtedly look more realistic.  
We contend, however, that this move towards complexity should not be 
embraced as the sole research strategy of SFC practitioners. Every researcher who has 
ever worked with simulations knows that intuition tends to vanish as the models grow in 
                                                            
25 Godley and Lavoie (2007) themselves come pretty close to this statement.  
26 We recognize that supply-side and institutional issues have not received the attention that Kaldorians, 
neo-Schumpeterians, and regulationists think they deserve. But we believe that there is no strong reason 
for that. The same can be said about the construction of agent-based SFC models.   
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size. Big models are pretty difficult to tame (even by their own creators), and even more 
difficult to teach.  
Moreover, and maybe more importantly, one has to keep in mind the fact that 
the appearance of realism can be deceptive. The increase in size multiplies structures 
and behavioral functions about which we probably do not know much. It can well be 
that, at least from a certain point on, the bigger is the model, the less applicable it will 
be.  
A telling example of such difficulties is provided by Dos Santos and Zezza’s 
(2008) “simplified benchmark” SFC growth model. It is proposed as a benchmark 
because it supposedly contains just the basic set of sectors and assets Post-Keynesian 
economists would not dispense with, while being simple enough to allow for an 
analytical solution. Its social structure displays poor households, rentiers, firms, banks, 
and the government. The assets are bank deposits and loans, government bills, capital 
goods and equities. Though simple, the model contains 14 exogenous parameters. This 
means that to fully master the comparative statics of such a simple artificial economy, 
the user would have to understand the implications of a very large number of different 
combinations of exogenous shocks. More realistic models (with more exogenous 
parameters) can get much more difficult to understand, of course.  
But big models are not merely difficult to understand. They are also difficult to 
use for applied purposes, for doing that requires the estimation or calibration of very 
many exogenous parameters. In each of these estimates/calibrations errors are bound to 
occur. The cumulative effect of all of them can distort considerably the conclusions one 
arrives at.   
This is why we favor two other complementary  modeling strategies. We 
discussed one of them – the direct investigation of equilibrium conditions and reduced 
forms – in Dos Santos and Macedo e Silva (2009). For reasons we explained in some 
detail, the study of steady states may be useful even when one does not believe (we 
certainly don’t) that the economy tends towards them. In a nutshell, a SFC steady state 
is a situation in which all stocks and flows are growing at the same rate, so the relative 
sizes and compositions of the balance sheets of all sectors of the economy (and 
therefore their economic/financial “power” and/or “fragility”) are kept constant. It is 
obviously useful to compare the actual behavior of the economy with such a benchmark 
– and it is certainly interesting to know whether an economy is getting nearer or farther 
from such a situation.  
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In simple models, such as Harrod’s or Solow’s, a straightforward condition 
assures that the economy is in steady state: capital and income must grow at the same 
rate, keeping the capital/product ratio stable. In heterodox SFC models, depending on 
the number of sectors considered, the steady state requires the simultaneous fulfilling of 
a greater number of conditions, so as to make sure that every flow or stock in the system 
is growing at the same rate.  
Let us briefly examine a very simple case. Assume, in a closed model with 
firms, households and government (but without banks), that ΔK/K = ΔY/Y. This is now 
only a necessary – but not sufficient – condition for the economy to be in steady state. 
This condition is compatible, for instance, with a situation in which the debt ratios of 
any sector (relative to its own income or net worth or to aggregate income and capital) 
are growing, perhaps explosively. Let us absolve the usual culprit, assuming that public 
deficit/public debt = ΔY/Y as well. Assume, however, that retained profits, smaller than 
investment (so that firms have a negative financial balance which is financed by, say, 
issuing bonds) are growing at a slower pace than investment (maybe because firms are 
distributing more and more profits). Now, this configuration has several implications: as 
firms’ financial balance is increasingly negative, households’ financial balance (and 
saving) must be increasingly positive. Moreover, the ratio between firms’ liabilities 
(debt or equity) and variables such as households’ total assets, firm’s profits, aggregate 
income and capital must be rising. In other words, firms’ financial fragility is rising. If, 
however, we assume that firms’ retained profits grow at the same rate as GDP and 
capital, then (in this model) we may be sure that the economy will be in steady state, for 
this implies that households’ financial balance (and wealth) must too be growing at the 
same pace. Now, if we inserted another sector in the model (say, the rest of the world), 
we would need to add up a new steady state condition – for example, even if firms 
profits are now growing steadily with income, households debt with non-residents may 
be growing at a quicker pace. 
Whatever the size of the model, however, it will always be true that, in the SFC 
steady state, flows and stocks will grow at the same rate and the ratio of any sector’s 
financial balance and net wealth to such variables as aggregate GDP (or capital) will be 
constant.  
Now, what is interesting is that, even if we are uncertain about the precise  sizes 
of the sectoral balance sheets in any point in time and/or about the determinants of their 
evolution in time we will be able to say useful things about these if we happen to know  
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the actual time series of the sectoral financial balances, especially with the help of 
further information, however fragmented it may be.   
Hence our second complementary strategy, which is, of course, the use of 
modified versions of the New Cambridge three balances model, as we try to explain in 
the remaining of this paper.  
 




The so-called “New Cambridge School” is unique in many ways. Having appeared in 
the Department of Applied Economics of the University of Cambridge, it articulated 
one of the few – if not the only – comprehensive empirical modeling strategy(ies) 
associated with the theoretical views of the Cambridge post-Keynesians.
27 In so doing, 
it played an important role in the British macroeconomic policy debate in the 1970s,
28 
but lost virtually all its influence in a matter of years, due to its inability to convince an 
increasingly orthodox and technical profession of the validity of its theoretical 
hypotheses and of the methods it used to obtain its empirical results.
29  In this section 
we argue that the merits of the “New Cambridge School” were many and can and 
should be dissociated from its flaws.  
 
4.1 – From “New Cambridge” to Godley and Cripps (1983) 
 
 
The “New Cambridge” view is associated with the work of a group of macroeconomists 
of the Department of Applied Economics (DAE) of the University of Cambridge-UK in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Led by Wynne Godley, who was brought to Cambridge by 
Nicholas Kaldor in 1970, New Cambridge economists were vocal advocates of Polak’s 
twin deficits hypothesis (even though for different reasons). They called attention (as 
early as in 1972, in policy-making circles)
30 to the fact that the private financial balance 
of the British economy had been relatively small and stable for many years – so that any 
                                                            
27 Nicholas Kaldor, in particular. Targetti (1992, p. 318 and p. 322) and Mata (2006) go as far as 
identifying New Cambridge views with Kaldor’s own.  
28 See Cripps et al. (1976), Higgins (1976), and Cuthbertson (1979), inter alia, for details.   
29 As noted by Godley (1992, pp. 195-196), one of the “aspects (in particular) of the work of the (…) 
[New Cambridge group] which put its members into a category which may be termed “dissenting  (…) 
was the unconventional view we took about how to construct and use an econometric model.” See also 
Blinder (1978, p. 83). 
30 See Budd (1998), for example.  
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(conventional Keynesian) attempts to increase effective demand by means of a 
relaxation of fiscal policy would only worsen the British current account balance. In 
early 1974 Wynne Godley and Francis Cripps (a macroeconomist working at the DAE) 
felt confident enough to state their position in the pages of the London Times,
31 which 
then prompted a response by “old-school” Keynesians Richard Kahn and Michael 
Posner, who basically argued that Mundell-Fleming type constructs admit New 
Cambridge results as special – though unlikely – cases.
32   
New Cambridge economists did not want to enter theoretical debates, though 
(Matta, 2006, p.10). Their point was that – no matter what Kahn and Posner thought 
about it in theoretical terms – their position was empirically solid. Indeed, a year later 
they would claim that “there exists a functional relationship which can be estimated 
with a reasonable degree of accuracy between total private expenditure (including 
investment) on the one hand and total private income (including taxes and certain kinds 
of borrowing) on the other” (CEPG, 1975, quoted in Cripps et al., 1976, p.46). In 1974 
this functional relationship was estimated (for the period 1954-1972, and using annual 
data) to be the following
33:  
 
PX = .533YD + .416 YD
-1 + .899HP + .790BA + .962S (Cripps et al. 1976, p.46);  
 
where PX  stands for the “total private expenditure (including stockbuilding and net 
intra-company investment abroad),” YD is the “private disposable income after tax and 
transfers,” HP is the “net increase in consumer hire purchase debt,” BA stands for the 
“net increase in bank advances to the personal sector,” and S stands for “changes in the 
book value of stocks and work in progress in the private sector” (ibid), all in real terms. 
  New Cambridge economists attached great importance to the fact that the sum of 
the coefficients of current and lagged disposable income in the private expenditure 
equation (.533+.416) was close to one. This result was interpreted to mean that 
“virtually all the disposable income of the private sector as a whole will be spent on 
                                                            
31 Godley and Cripps published two articles in The Times in January 22 and 23, 1974. The first “set a 
stage of impending catastrophe” (Mata, 2006, p. 6) – i.e argued that a relaxation of the fiscal policy would 
likely generate an exchange rate crisis. The second argued that export subsidies and import restrictions 
were better alternatives than the use of fiscal policy to increase effective demand and employment in 
Britain in a sustainable way.  
32 The term “New Cambridge” was actually coined by Kahn and Posner to designate the views of Godley 
and Cripps and differentiate them from conventional (“old Cambridge”) Keynesian orthodoxy.  
33 Needless to say, current econometric knowledge does not favor estimations with so few degrees of 
freedom and – in the case of linear models with constant parameters, at least - stresses the need to 
differentiate non-stationary time series from stationary ones.   
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goods and services with a very short lag [i.e. one year],” an empirical finding which 
Godley and Fetherston (1978, p.34) called the “explicit hypothesis associated with New 
Cambridge,” Indeed, this result implied that “the chief determinant of (…) [the private 
financial balance] is the change in disposable income” (ibid); so that it would be 
generally small and stable when measured relative to income, which in turn implied that 
the use of fiscal policy to fine tune the economy would necessarily increase both the 
government and current account deficits (relative to GDP), as denounced by Godley and 
Cripps in their first New Cambridge manifesto in The Times. 
    Macroeconometric estimates are notoriously unreliable, though.
34 So New 
Cambridge economists sought to provide solid theoretical foundations for their case. 
The highly innovative – but poorly contextualized and therefore unappreciated – book 
by Godley and Cripps (1983) was meant precisely to do that.
35   
 
4.2 – Revisiting Godley and Cripps (1983) 
 
 
Godley and Cripps’ basic hypothesis [or “behavioural axiom”] is that agents [i.e. 
households and businesses] have a desired financial assets/income “norm.” Different 
agents are assumed to have different norms, but aggregation problems are assumed 
away so that the economy behaves as if “the private sector as a whole” had a fixed 
financial assets/income “norm” (Godley and Cripps, 1983, p.60).
36  
Indeed, Godley and Cripps state clearly that “the main results [they present] are 
conditional on the behavioral axiom that stock variables will not change indefinitely as 
ratios to related flow variables” (ibid, pp.41-42). Moreover, they “(…) admit without 
reservation that if stock-flow norms were to move about too wildly most of the theory 
set out in this book would be rendered useless, though the stability of norms is 
                                                            
34 The New Cambridge equation did not perform well (or “broke down massively,” in the words of a 
critic) when the sample period was increased from 1954-1972 to 1954-1974. New Cambridge economists 
later attributed this failure to the fact that they did not (in 1975) account for the rising inflation when 
calculating BA, HP, and S.   
35 “(…) the New Cambridge hypothesis originally published in 1974 (…) attracted some attention at the 
time but never gained acceptance, being too crudely conceived and expressed to carry conviction as a 
realistic representation of the central driving mechanism of a complex modern economy. Yet the New 
Cambridge hypothesis is the grandfather of the theory presented in the first half of this book” (Godley and 
Cripps, 1983, p.16). It is telling in particular, that Godley and Cripps felt they should make clear that they 
did “not believe it is possible to establish precise [economic] behavioural relationships comparable with 
the natural laws of physical sciences by techniques of statistical inference” (ibid, p.44, emphasis in the 
original). 
36 Later in the book (in chapter 13) it is argued that agents might have other “norms” as well – for 
example, a total wealth (including real estate)/income norm. The applied macroeconomist should 
therefore pick the norm that s/he found empirically more constant (Godley and Cripps, 1983, p.267).    
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consistent with fluctuations in actual stock-flow ratios” (ibid, p.42). The authors then 
presented two contentions. According to the first one, “stock-flow norms which are 
crucial to determining how actual economic systems work do, as a matter of fact, 
exhibit a fair degree of stability” (ibid, p. 43).  
  In light of modern SFC constructs (but not, of course, at the time the book was 
published), it is easy to see that Godley and Cripps’ assumption is roughly correct when 
the economy is near a SFC steady-state – a situation in which not only the private 
financial assets (net of liabilities) to disposable income ratio is fixed, but in which all 
stock-flow and stock-stock ratios are fixed as well. But it is fair to say that Godley and 
Cripps put much more emphasis on the stability of the private financial assets (liquid of 
liabilities) to private disposable income ratio than on the stability of other stock-flow 
ratios – the hypothesis being that the other relevant stock-flow ratios in a three sector 
model (i.e. the government debt to GDP ratio and the economy´s net international 
investment position to GDP ratio) would adjust to fiscal and trade parameters/policy 
and to the relative constancy of the private stock-flow ratio (or “norm”) and therefore 
could deteriorate/improve for a while (a situation they called a “quasi-steady-state”).   
Naturally enough, the assumption that the private sector as a whole acts as to 
keep its private financial assets (net of liabilities) to disposable income ratio fixed 
sounds much less plausible in the first decade of the 21
st century (well after the 
emergence of post-1980s financial-led capitalism) than it did in the United Kingdom in 
the 1970s. But no serious author in the modern SFC tradition would disagree with 
Godley and Cripps’ second contention, i.e. that “even when the norms change, the 
consideration of stock-flow and flow-flow relationships and an understanding of the 
logical connection between them provide important diagnostics; it gives a systematic 
technique for analyzing actual data” (ibid, p.43). 
  It would be unfair, however, to characterize Godley and Cripps (1983) only as 
an important precursor of the modern SFC tradition. Quite on the contrary, it is 
important to notice that they propose an original and minimalist approach to 
macroeconomic modeling that is quite different in spirit from the direction the modern 
SFC literature has taken in the last few years. Indeed, they state explicitly that “since 
human behavior is so varied, (…) [their] objective will be to establish principles of 
analysis which capitalize on adding-up constraints so as to confine the behavioral 
processes to a relatively small number of variables, each of which can then be the object 
of empirical study. The smaller the number of behavioral variables which govern how  
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the system must function in view of the logical constraints, the more powerful will be 
our theory as a model for organizing and interpreting data” (Godley and Cripps, 1983, 
p.18). They felt, in particular, that the fact that “the ratio of purely logical propositions 
to those which are contingent on behavioral assumptions is higher [in their book] than is 
normal in a book on macroeconomics” was a virtue, not a vice (ibid, p.44) – for “few 
[behavioral] laws of economics will hold good across decades or between countries” 
and “the evolution of whole economies, like that of their political system is a highly 
contingent historical process” (ibid). 
 
4.3 – A Different – and Inclusive –View of New Cambridge: Some Notes on the “Free” 
Estimation of the 3 (or more) Financial Balances  
 
As discussed in section 2, one needs 10 variables in order to arrive at the three New 
Cambridge financial balances, which are Y, T, Trpe, Cp, Ip, Cg, Ig, Trge, X, and M (all 
measured in “real” terms). These are not, by any means, unfamiliar variables. Keynesian 
economists have, for decades, estimated private consumption and investment functions, 
as well as import and export functions for goods and services. Hypotheses about the 
fiscal variables are also present in each and every textbook of macroeconomics. And the 
transfers among sectors are only slightly less familiar.   
  We contend that any Keynesian (i.e effective demand) model that theorizes 
about all these 10 variables – and interprets the dynamic behavior of the implied three 
sectoral financial balances along the lines discussed in the first section of this paper – 
should be seen as a New Cambridge model. And if our definition sounds too inclusive
37, 
this is on purpose. As Godley and Cripps (1983, p.44) we do not believe one can be sure 
of the precise determinants of any of these variables (or of any other variable which 
results of the aggregate behavior of millions of people transacting in historical time) in 
any point in time, let alone of how it will evolve over time. Naturally enough, in any 
given point in time one can and should look for “good” econometric specifications for 
all of them, and chances are that one will find them. But these estimates – and virtually 
all macroeconomic empirical regularities for that matter – are bound to vary over time 
and in different countries. So it makes sense to give “freedom” to econometricians to 
exploit as far as they can country-specific and historically-specific empirical 
regularities.    
                                                            
37 It includes, for instance, the so-called “Goldman-Sachs” approach (see, for instance, Casadio and 
Paradiso, 2009).   
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  To be sure, all 10 variables above are flow variables. And there are very good 
reasons to believe that their dynamics are influenced by their stock counterparts
38. 
Moreover, New Cambridge authors are well known for their penchant for estimating 
“private expenditure functions” (i.e. a behavioral equation for the sum of private 
consumption with private investment) and for using the stock of private financial assets 
(net of liabilities) and/or asset prices (as proxies of capital gains or losses of the owners 
of these assets) and/or credit availability as explanatory variables. We contend, 
however, that these are only empirical/econometric matters and that nothing in the 
(broad, dynamic SFC) interpretation of the three financial balances depend crucially on 
the precise determinants of private expenditure (i.e private consumption plus private 
investment) assumed in one´s model. As discussed earlier in this paper, what one gains 
from looking closely at the balances is an understanding of how the liquidity of the 
underlying sectoral balance sheets is evolving. And, naturally enough, all one needs to 
get a sense of how the liquidity levels of the various underlying sectoral balance sheets 
are likely to evolve in time is a good (Keynesian, of course) sense of how the sectoral 
financial balances will evolve in time (and, as Barbosa-Filho et al. 2006 have made 
clear, several patterns are possible). If one can project these balances with satisfactory 
(“out of sample”) degrees of precision using separate consumption and investment 
functions, so be it. If private expenditure functions happen to be more precise, so be it 
too. To make the same point differently, if the economy is close to a SFC steady-state, 
then the use of the original New Cambridge “private expenditure function” is probably 
the most elegant and parsimonious alternative. But if the experience of the 1990´s 
“financial-led” capitalist growth has taught us anything it is that economies can get 
significantly far from their full SFC steady-state.  
Note also that being able to estimate the disaggregated components of the 
private financial balances would also be quite useful. The problem is that high 
frequency data on intra-private sector transfers and property income paid is not easy to 
find or simply does not exist in many countries. The usual procedure, then, is to 
estimate the three aggregated financial balances and complement these estimates (and 
projections) with extra-model information on the disaggregated components of the 
                                                            
38 There is considerable empirical evidence, for instance, that T, Cg, and Ig (or, at least, the “primary 
government surplus” implied by the latter) depend(s) – in a cointegration sense – on the stock of 
government debt.   
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private financial balance – which, as discussed in section 1, do not change erratically 
over time.   
 
5 – Concluding Remarks: Towards a General Post-Keynesian SFC Applied 
Macroeconomic Modeling Strategy?   
 
 
Anyone who has tried to read through a modern Post-Keynesian SFC model knows that 
these constructs tend to assume very many behavioral assumptions. Some of the 
assumed behavioral parameters (such as for example, the wealth-elasticity of 
consumption or the interest-elasticity of investment) are less difficult to estimate than 
others (such as the animal spirits of firms or the liquidity preference of rentiers). All of 
them result from billions of interactions by dozens of millions of people in historical 
time – so only by chance would a few of them be relatively fixed in any, say, decade. 
Moreover, changes in only a few of them can change significantly the results of the SFC 
model simulations. In this particular sense, the emphases of the modern SFC literature 
are quite different from the original New Cambridge authors.  
  As mentioned before, we believe this is hardly surprising. Modern SFC models 
are crucially important from a theoretical point of view – in the sense that they can 
“prove” that certain configurations of effective demand  are (un)sustainable, and 
illuminate the details of what happens when the economy is far from the steady-state 
(i.e. they go well beyond “steady-state analyses”) . New Cambridge type models are 
considerably simpler – for they were meant to shed light on the medium-term trends of 
actual capitalist economies in historical time, so as to guide real time policy-making 
decisions.  
We believe that the direct  usefulness of modern SFC models for applied 
purposes is at least doubtful, for the “mapping” of the theoretical model variables to 
existing data series is very difficult at best, while the very size of the models would 
likely make the combined effect of the various estimation/calibration errors too much to 
bear. We therefore believe that modern SFC models should be used as an auxiliary tool, 
to help the analyst understand which precise types of (plausible) behavior would 
generate the financial balances, stock-flow and stock-stock-ratios directly verified in 
practice. 
Moreover, we strongly believe that direct estimation of the financial balances is 
an useful enterprise – as the work of the macroeconomic modeling team of the Levy  
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Institute has made clear. We emphasize, however, that the estimation of these balances 
does not depend on any specific hypothesis about the constancy of any given SFC ratio. 
In fact, we vote in favor of an applied modeling strategy that combines direct estimates 
of the three “New Cambridge” financial balances with (i) non-model information about 
the households, firms’, and banks’ financial balances and balance sheets; and (ii) a 
stylized (but detailed) theoretical SFC model of the economy at hand. Naturally enough, 
something very close to this strategy has actually been adopted by the macroeconomic 
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